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Abstract—Agricultural inputs can create negative externalities.  For risk averting agents, risk will
alter production decisions while the existence of institutions to insure against adverse states of
nature will likely restore decisions toward levels under risk neutrality.  In this paper, conditions
are identified on a stochastic technology to test  : that risk averters choose smaller input
levels than risk neutral agents, and  : that an increase in risk aversion reduces input use.  A
robust statistical method (Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden) to test for dominance is adapted to
stochastic production relations.  It is found that   is likely true for nitrogen application on
Iowa corn.  Weaker evidence is found in favor of hypothesis  .
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JEL Classification: D8, C1, C8, Q0.2 A detailed exposition of this problem, and of regulatory solutions, is provided in Chambers and
Quiggin (1996) and in Quiggin and Chambers.
3 Here, payouts are a function of adverse outcomes that a firm has no control over.  Insurance on
rainfall levels or flood levels rather than on crop shortfall and property damage are examples.
Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use
Production uncertainty is pervasive in many agricultural environments.  The market solution, risk
markets, often fail because the costs of maintaining such markets cannot be covered in
expectation, because the markets are deterred by regulation or even prohibited, or because of
problems regarding information asymmetry.  Thus, firms often have to bear the full brunt of the
uncertainty when making decisions.  Governments have many reasons to be interested in how the
risk environment that faces growers affects factor use.  Among these, we focus on two strongly
interrelated reasons; that risk market incompleteness may impede the overall level of factor use
efficiency and that the level of input use often generates externalities.
As an example, field crop production tends to be a risky enterprise while inputs such as
pesticides and nitrogen are known to run off into the water supply.  It is often difficult to regulate
these non-point pollution sources.
2  Chambers and Quiggin (1996) propose to do so through an
insurance scheme that pays out on adverse states of nature.
3  But if regulatory schemes such as
this are to work, it is necessary to understand the effect of risk aversion and risk market
incompleteness on pollution.  If it is found that the existence or level of risk aversion reduces the
use of polluting inputs, then risk management instruments are quite likely to complement with
the inputs in the production process.  And so, as pointed out by Chambers and Quiggin (1996),
government actions to facilitate firm-level risk management through legislation or subsidies may
exacerbate a pollution problem.
The intent of our paper is to align more closely findings from the expected utility modeling
framework with empirical methods.  In the theoretical dimension, our work extends findings by
MacMinn and Holtmann and especially by Ramaswami.  The results we develop rely on the
diffidence theorem due to Gollier and Kimball.4 For example, Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz employ the specification in a study of behavior by
Kansas wheat growers.  Smale et al. apply it when inquiring into the effects of diversity in wheat
varieties on yield risk.
2
In order to understand the role of risk aversion on choice for a stochastic production
technology, we need to characterize the technology.  To date the most influential empirically
implementable characterization has been the Just and Pope (1978) production function.
4  While a
major econometric innovation, its two-moment construction limits its ability to explain behavior
in the expected utility framework.  One concern, identified in Rothschild and Stiglitz, is that an
increase in variance does not capture all attributes of risk that a von Neumann & Mortgenstern
(vNM) risk averter faces.  A second concern, due to Chambers and Quiggin (2001), is that the
Just-Pope technology imposes inflexibility on how inputs and states of nature interact.  In the
manner of Ramaswami, we will work with a very general representation of a stochastic
technology.  As a consequence, we are in a position to establish and test the exact conditions on
the technology such that the existence and level of vNM risk aversion have determinate effects
on input use.
Our empirical methods are adapted from the small literature on discerning partial orderings
among a set of empirical distributions.  Recognizing that a quest for stochastic dominance among
empirical distributions requires an accommodation of the sampling error problem, Tolley and
Pope developed a non-parametric test on a pair of such distributions.  The test statistic is
generated by drawings from the pooled observations.  McFadden rigorized the permutation test
approach to generate a species of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the non-comparability of two
distributions in the senses of first-order and second-order dominance.  Among the limitations of
McFadden’s test are the requirement that empirical distributions have equal sample sizes, the
assumption that the distribution drawings are independent, and the need to calculate significance
levels through Monte Carlo simulations.  A test developed by Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and Singh
(KRS), based on the intersection-union concept, allows for unbalanced sample sizes and5 As with other intersection – union tests, such as in KRS, the test does not exploit the covariance
structure of the distributions to be compared.  This buys computational efficiency at the cost of
lower statistical efficiency.  Alternative approaches, such as in Davidson and Duclos or
Dardanoni and Forcina, include the structure of the covariance matrix in their test statistics. 
According to Goldberger, taking into account the covariance structure leads to efficiency gains
relative to multiple comparison procedures “mainly when these estimates are negatively
correlated” (Dardanoni and Forcina, page 58).  This is not the case with the data we will analyze.
3
simplifies the work needed to establish the test significance level.  However, the KRS test does
assume independence in drawings.  Anderson also provides a convenient test because the test
statistic is known to be distributed according to a variant of the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit statistic
with known asymptotic distribution.  But the test assumes independence.
We have balanced data, and our main concern with the aforementioned tests is with the need
for independence.  The production relation we seek to understand is that of nitrogen on corn
yield.  Independence is likely not a valid assumption for nitrogen-conditioned corn yield
distributions because weather and other factors are likely common drivers for all distributions. 
We choose an extension to McFadden’s approach.  By assuming stationarity, !-mixing, and
generalized exchangeability, Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (KMM) account for dependence
between distributions and rely on Monte Carlo analysis to derive the test distributions.  Their test
is an intersection union test that relies on multiple interval comparisons.
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In section 2 we ascertain an empirically testable condition on a stochastic payoff function
such that the effect of risk aversion on input choice is determinate.  We also identify conditions
such that an increase in risk aversion has a determinate effect on choice.  The data to be studied
is discussed in section 3.  We then present the statistical methods and apply them to the data. 
The results are analyzed, and the paper concludes.
Model and Theory
In accord with standard notation for models of expected utility maximization, let   be a twice
continuously differentiable, increasing and concave utility function.  Concavity need not be strict,4
(1)
(2)
and we denote the class of all utility functions satisfying our assumptions as  .  In a two-
period model, argument z is the payoff and is itself a twice continuously differentiable function;
.  Here, b is a time point 0 action chosen from the closed interval  .  Variable x
is an index measuring a random factor that is realized at time point 1.  The index over time point
1 states of nature is chosen so that more is better, i.e.,   where the subscript denotes a
derivative.  And at no additional loss of generality, we assume that  .  The variable has
an absolutely continuous distribution,  , with strictly positive support on all  .  The
time point 0 problem is then to  , and the first-order condition is
Strict concavity of   in b ensures a unique solution, and we make this assumption.
Risk-Neutral vs. Risk Averse
For the risk neutral agent the problem simplifies to   with first-order
condition  .  We denote the optimal argument by   so that  .
.  Because the objective function is concave in the action, all risk averters choose   such
that   if 
And all risk averters choose action   such that   if the inequality in (2) is reversed.
Integrating the left-hand expression by parts yields 6 This integration by parts might be said to be ‘from above’.  The usual integration by parts is
‘from below’, in which case we have   in place of the




where optimality at the risk-neutral solution has been employed.
6  Some work, provided in
Appendix A, establishes that the left-hand side of Eqn. (3) is negative (positive) for all risk
averters such that   if and only if  
Our results can be summarized as follows
PROPOSITION 1.  Let   and  .  Then   for all   if and
only if the payoff relationship adheres to condition (4) above.
Given that  , monotonicity of   in s would be a
sufficient condition for the proposition to hold.  However, monotonicity cannot hold because
 cannot be uniform in sign unless it has zero value on all sets of non-null measure.
Now let us assume that   takes on the specific functional form   where 
 is a production function, p is the output price, and w is the factor price.  Then condition
(4) becomes   where  .  Noting that
, condition (4) for the payoff function in question may be re-written as7 The direction of the inequality in   is perhaps confusing.  The direction ! is chosen to be




Ramaswami has identified a criterion that is essentially the same as that in (5), and it is clear
that if   is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in s then relation (5) assuredly
holds.  The latter sufficient condition requires that  .  That is,
 where E is the expectation operator and conditions on the
expectation are given after the vertical bar symbol.  The condition requires that mean marginal
product, conditional on the source of randomness being in the upper interval  , is no smaller
(no larger) than marginal product evaluated at the lower bound of that upper interval.  As we
shall show later, with a little re-working of (5), an alternative and distinct sufficient condition is
that .
In the empirical analysis to follow, we will test for condition (5), and we will abstract from
the particular point of evaluation.  When (5) is true in the " direction, then we state that
hypothesis   is accepted and so we conclude that  .
7  When (5) is true in the !
direction, then we state that hypothesis   is accepted, i.e., we accept  .  In its discrete
form, condition (5) may be re-written as 
Because it has been assumed that  , quantity   measures the sth quantile of the8 As a point of reference for Proposition 1, a stochastic order related to that described by (7)
above has been studied in a non-economic context by Fernandez-Ponce, Kochar, and Muñoz-
Perez.  Their order, the right-spread order, is the quantile variant of the mean residual life order
which is a central concept in the statistical theory of reliability.  Other related stochastic
structures have arisen in studies by Jewitt and by Landsberger and Meilijson on the economics of
welfare under partial insurance.  To our knowledge, no empirical tests for any of this set of





input-conditioned random production variable  .  In this light, we can write (6) as 
For future reference, we denote   so that (7) becomes
We may interpret (5), (7), and (8) as follows.  The expected marginal value product conditional




The contrast between risk neutrality and risk aversion is rather stark.  A more general scenario is
to contrast agents that are ordered by their degree of risk aversion.  In this case, it will be shown
that the critical functional is
The important attribute is whether   has a cross-derivative that is uniform in sign. 
PROPOSITION 2.  Let   where p and w are positive constants, and




reduces (increases) optimum b if
The proof is provided in Appendix B.  As with comparison (5), in the empirical analysis we
will test for condition (10), and we will abstract from the particular point of evaluation.  When
(10) is true in the " direction, then we state that hypothesis   is accepted and so we conclude
that   where the   are coefficients of risk aversion for utility
function  , and where  .  In earlier work, MacMinn and Holtmann demonstrated that
if   has a positive cross derivative then an increase in risk aversion reduces optimum b.  As
Proposition 2 shows, it suffices that the less structured expression   possess the
property.
To see how Propositions 1 and 2 relate, note that inequality (7) may be written as
Thus, as should be the case, condition (7) is less restrictive than (10).  In Proposition 1 we
compare an arbitrary risk averse agent with a fixed agent in the equivalence class of risk neutral
agents.  It is because the degree of risk aversion for one agent is fixed that the fixed value 
arises in (11) and (7).  The comparison in Proposition 2 is more general, and therefore more
demanding, in that neither agent is fixed at a point along an ordering of degrees of risk aversion. 
This added generality is purchased at the expense of the more restrictive condition (10) relative
to (7).
9  If an econometric test accepts (10) in a given direction of inequality, then it is likely to9
accept (7) in the same direction.  But it should be no surprise if a version of (7) holds when the
corresponding version of (10) is not supported by data.  A rejection of (7) is, however, possible
even if (10) is accepted.  This would occur if there exists overwhelming evidence in favor of (10)
on   while the data in the neighborhood of   does not support (10). 
 Data
We test for the direction of inequality (7) using Iowa corn yield data that was collected from four
different Iowa farms during 1987-1991 using ten different nitrogen application levels from 0-300
lbs./acre.  The data has previously been used by Babcock and Hennessy.  The overall sample
consists of 600 observations and we have subsamples of 60 observations per nitrogen application
rate.  The data comes from four distinct regional locations over a time period of five years.  Table
1 gives the means and standard deviations of yield observations by site.
A statistical analysis of state-level Iowa corn yields shows a clear time trend in the data due
to technical progress.  Hence, we postulate a deterministic component of yield depending on time
t, as well as location effects and a stochastic component.  To account for changes in yield due to
technical progress, the data is corrected by estimating a linear time trend for Iowa corn yields
from Iowa average yield over the period 1973-1994 (Iowa Dept. of Agriculture).  Corn yields are
estimated to increase by 1.526 bu./acre/year.  The parameter to this linear time trend has a t-value
of 2.326 and the regression R
2 is 0.213.
Denote observation i at site j for year t at a nitrogen application level b as  .  The
average yield across years and sites is formed as  , and the estimated mean yield for any
given year is given as   where the linear time trend t is centered at t = 0
in 1989.  The observations are then realized as the sum of the mean and a residual component,
.  Using this series of residuals, we tested for equality in mean across sites,
and we rejected the hypothesis of equality at the 1% level with an F statistic  . 
Therefore, we proceeded by correcting for the differences across sites.  The resulting yield10
(12)
deviations, as functions of the level of nitrogen applied, are estimated as   where
and where   is the site j mean given nitrogen level b.  The mean of the   is zero by
construction, and the resulting standard deviations are shown in Table 2.  It appears that the level
of yield variability increases with the quantity of nitrogen applied.  This gives a first indication
that the character of the distribution, in terms of higher moments, changes as b changes, and so
there is circumstantial evidence to hypothesize that the level of risk aversion may dampen the
level of input choice.  But a more formal analysis is required.
Empirical Procedures
We have shown that a risk averse agent will tend to decrease factor use relative to risk neutrality
if   is increasing in b, while factor use will be ordered by degree of risk aversion if 
has a cross-derivative that is uniform in sign.  Using the corn-yield data, we wish to find
empirical evidence for or against these attributes.  Equation (7) compares two corrected
conditional means.  In varying the point s of truncation for the conditional mean we are
comparing two distributions that, without practical loss of generality, can be assumed to spread
over a finite interval and can thus be transformed to take values on the [0,1] interval.  An
examination of Eqn. (7) or Eqn. (10) shows that we are in fact comparing two quantile
distributions when we study   across s at two different levels of b or when we study 
 across s at two different levels of b.  In the case of  , the quantile can be read
immediately as  .  For  , with   then the quantile is  .
When comparing quantiles, the randomness arises because the empirical distribution
constructed from the data consists of random draws from the true underlying distribution.  Tests
for comparing quantile distributions have been discussed in the literature in relation to stochastic
dominance (e.g., Tolley and Pope, and also KMM).  Recently, as in Anderson and in Maasoumi10 A process   is !-mixing if there exists a sequence   such that
 and   for each event A regarding the behavior of the
process up to time n and each event B regarding the behavior of the process after time   (see
KMM).  As such the !-mixing property can be viewed as the requirement of asymptotic
convergence toward independence as the lag along dimension n increases. 
11 An example of generalized exchangeable random variables   is 
 where   are independent random variables with mean zero and
variance one, where    are identically distributed, and where the  ,  , and 
are parameters (see, again, KMM).
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and Heshmati, such tests have been applied to compare the Lorenz curve representations of
income distributions.
We implement the test proposed by KMM because this test can accommodate dependence
between the distributions being compared.  Two types of regularity conditions are required for
the test.  These are that: (a) the observations from each yield distribution are strictly stationary
and !-mixing
10; and (b) the random variables satisfy the generalized exchangeability property.
11 
The !-mixing assumption is required to establish asymptotic convergence via the appropriate
version of the strong law of large numbers (White and Domowitz).  Because the underlying
problem of establishing order dominance, or not, among distributions is innately symmetric, the
generalized exchangeability property is convenient in that it admits symmetric treatment of the
data when seeking to approximate test statistic confidence intervals.  The conditions are very
general and it seems reasonable to apply the test to our data.  Concern might arise with regard to
condition (b), and so we present the correlation matrix of the data in table 2.  It is clear that the
general structure is very stable for input levels other than the extreme values   and
.
The test proposed by KMM is an extension of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to multivariate
distributions.  For a pair of random variables   with respective cumulative distribution
functions  and  , it compares the distributions with respect to their first-degree
stochastic maximality property.  A set of distributions is defined as first-degree maximal if no12
(13)
(14)
distribution in the set is first-degree weakly stochastically dominated by another distribution in
the set, i.e., neither   nor  .  Therefore, the random variables
 are first-degree stochastically maximal if
   over the index set.  That is, first-degree maximality
requires that all distributions in the maximal set cross.  Comparing the distributions for first-
degree stochastic maximality is a two-sided test.  By contrast, tests on
 are one-sided tests.  These one-sided tests are also computed in the
procedure.  
Identify now empirical distributions constructed from N observations by an appended
subscripted N, i.e.,  .  The test statistic should then test for the sign of 
KMM derive the statistical properties of the test statistic and provide a computational algorithm
to test for both first-degree stochastic dominance and maximality.  Since the distribution of 
is not analytically tractable, their procedure is based on Monte Carlo simulations that calculate
the critical value of the test statistic.  In this sense the test is exact.  Upon subjecting the test to
Monte Carlo experiments over varying hypotheses and sample sizes, KMM conclude that their
statistic for first-order dominance performs reasonably well even at sample sizes as small as 50.  
Turning to our application, the empirical distributions yield the random variables to compare
in Proposition 1 as
where the subscripted N on the expectation operator identifies a mean generated from the data.  If
 for all s, then the distribution of   in a sense dominates the
distribution of  .  For each nitrogen application level we observe an ordered sample of13
(15)
(16)
, where we use the subscript N to denote the observed sample
statistics.  For the test we use the empirical distribution functions of   which is denoted
by  .  Applying this notation to equation (13) results in the inequality to be tested for,
where .
For the test of the condition underpinning Proposition 2 we proceed similarly and form the
sample equivalent to   as
Equation (16) gives effectively the observations to be compared for b and  , so that each test
entails   quantile comparisons.  The test statistic   for (16) then follows in
the way that (15) was constructed from (14).
Results
The results for testing Proposition 1 are summarized in tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 shows p-values
for the test statistic that the row first-degree stochastically dominates the column.  For instance
the p-value in the cell (column 1, row 3) is the p-value testing the hypothesis that  .
.  The value is 0.0764, and therefore the hypothesis that   dominates
 is not rejected at the 5% level.  Similarly the p-value in the cell (column 2, row 1)
tests the hypothesis that  .  It assumes a value of zero and hence this
hypothesis is rejected.
To aid in interpreting the general implications of the test outcomes reported in the tables, we
shade the cells in which the hypothesis of FSD  is rejected at a significance level of 0.05.  In the
upper right triangle, 9 of 45 tests are not rejected whereas in the lower triangle 14 out of 45 are
rejected.  The overall picture indicates that in most cases    , i.e., for14
most distribution comparisons, inequality (7) should be of the direction " and then we accept
 with inference that  .  Exceptions occur notably for the distributions arising from
factor levels   and  , which we could interpret as the upper end of suitable
nitrogen levels.  Actual nitrogen application rates on commercial Iowa corn vary between 125-
200 lb./acre and, of course, application rates that are of no commercial relevance should be of
little policy relevance.  Also, at high values exceptions occur for small ", i.e., close to the
diagonal of the table.  Then shifts in distributions according to increased fertilizer levels may not
be clear because the intra-distribution spread might not be clearly distinguished from inter-
distribution spread.
Table 4 reports the p-value for the hypothesis of not stochastic maximal, i.e., that one of the
two distributions compared in a test is first-degree stochastically dominated by the other. 
Consistent with the results in Table 3, where we found support for   in most cases, we cannot
reject the ‘not first-degree stochastically maximal’ hypothesis in most instances.  There are 9
exceptions among 45 tests at the 5% level of significance, and so in only 9 comparisons do we
conclude that the pair of distributions compared is first-degree stochastic maximal.  And 7 of
these 9 exceptions coincide with distribution comparisons where Table 3 indicated a test
outcome which was out of step with the generally supported hypothesis  .  This suggests that
the shaded boxes in the lower left triangle of Table 3 represent incomparabilities in the partial
order of distributions rather than reversals of the intuitive dominance relation.  A rejection of 2
tests among a set of 45 comparisons should not be surprising at the 5% significance level.
The results of the test for the stochastic structure underlying Proposition 2 are given in tables
5 and 6.  Consistent with the observation that we could nest Proposition 1 as a special case of
Proposition 2, the test outcomes do not as clearly support  , i.e., that the technology
conditions are sufficient to assert that the privately optimal use of fertilizer decreases as risk
aversion increases.  However, the general picture is supportive of  .  Notice, though, that
while more cells are shaded in Table 5 than in Table 3, the set of shaded cells in Table 5 need not15
contain the set of shaded cells in Table 3.  This is because, in contrast to the theoretical
comparison where violation of Proposition 1 implies violation of Proposition 2, the statistical
comparison allows for violations.  And violations at   may be covered over by a
preponderance of non-violations on  .
Discussion
This paper has provided quite strong evidence that, for stochastic corn production technologies in
Iowa, optimizing risk averters use less nitrogen than do optimizing risk neutral producers. 
Weaker evidence was found in favor of the claim that there is a monotone decreasing relation
between the degree of risk aversion and the optimal nitrogen application rate.  We did not
directly test whether nitrogen is a ‘risk increasing input’ because we would then have to settle on
a formal definition of that attribute.  Suppose that we define a risk increasing input as one that
falls with the choice-taker’s risk aversion index.  Then we find that nitrogen is likely risk
increasing, and so our results corroborate the conclusions of Just and Pope (1979), of Love and
Buccola, and of Nelson and Preckel.
We complete our study by making two points concerning the interpretation of our findings. 
The first is of an empirical nature, and is relevant for the data we have studied.  The Agricultural
Markets Transition Act, signed into law in the U.S.A. in 1996, replaced a price-contingent
subsidy of the form   where A and   are parameters and p is the market price
of certain crops.  The crops in question included corn.  Instead of this price-contingent subsidy,
growers were to receive a fixed annual transition payment, which we will denote by T.  This
subsidy was to decline towards zero over seven years.  Chavas and Holt have provided evidence
in support of the assertion that U.S. corn and soybean growers exhibit risk preferences that are
decreasing absolute risk averse (DARA).  And so the gradual elimination of transition payments
would, ceteris paribus, induce an increase in the degree of risk aversion.  The evidence in
support of our Proposition 2 would suggest that a drawback in the use of nitrogen would occur as16
the transition payments are phased out.
Our findings also have relevance when agents are exposed to multiple sources of risk.  Work
by Gollier and Pratt has considered the effect of introducing an actuarially adverse wealth shock. 
For example, suppose that the stochastic payoff   changes to   where y is random
with nonpositive expected value and where the random variables are independent.  Then, for a
given value of x, construct the indirect utility function  , i.e., the
expectation conditional on x.  A study of the impact of the introduction of wealth risk y on
welfare and optimal actions is equivalent to a study of the impact of preference function mapping
 on welfare and optimal actions.  Thus motivated, Gollier and Pratt studied the
properties of risk vulnerability.  For utility functions   and   mentioned above, and
assuming that y has nonpositive expected value,   is said to be risk vulnerable if   has a
larger coefficient of risk aversion than  , pointwise, over the relevant domain of x.  While an
exact characterization of the   that are risk vulnerable is rather involved, simpler necessary
and also simpler sufficient conditions are identified by Gollier and Pratt.  DARA is necessary. 
Concerning sufficiency, if  , which is called
the standardness condition, then vulnerability is assured.  Here, the superscripted term in
parentheses identifies the order of differentiation.  Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Averse risk
preferences together with DARA are sufficient for adherence to standardness.  Returning to
Proposition 2, our test for the impact of an increase in risk aversion converts immediately to
sufficient conditions on the technology such that the introduction of an independent, actuarially
unfair, background risk induces a reduction in optimal input use when risk attitudes are standard.17
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(A1)
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.  The forward implication follows immediately from noting that if
 is uniform in sign over  , then expression (3) has the opposite sign.  To
demonstrate necessity, we seek a violation such that a) the expressions in (2) and (3) are strictly
negative, while b) the expression in (4) is strictly positive at a point   but is strictly
negative outside a small metric neighborhood around that point.  Suppose that 
 at  .  We have assumed that   is integrable, and so we know that
 is continuous in s.  Therefore there exists an interval   of strictly positive
measure with   such that  .  Choose a set of strictly
positive measure,  , and a real number   such that 
.  Find an   such that  .  Choose 
 and  .  Now we can write
Thus, when condition (4) is violated then there exist concave utility functions such that optimal





Proof of Proposition 2.  As demonstrated in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995,
Proposition 6.C.2), agent # with utility function   is more risk averse than agent ! with utility
function   if and only if there exists an increasing and concave transformation   of U,
i.e.,   so that  .  For agent !, the equilibrium choice,  ,
satisfies
By concavity of the objective function, we have that  , where   optimizes for agent #, if
We will prove the result in the ! direction.  The other result can be demonstrated by
symmetric reasoning.  Integrating the left-hand expression in (B2) by parts, we have the
equivalent expression 
Therefore, we need to find conditions such that 




And so it would suffice to demonstrate that  .  But this is unlikely
to be true for all such s.  In particular, if   then   because  .
To find a more satisfactory condition, note that in our case the statement 
 may be written as  .  By condition (10), we have that the
expression   is monotone increasing in s.  Define   such that
.  Clearly, because   is increasing in s, we have
that   and  .  And so (B4) is true
for  .  For   we have from (10), i.e.,   increasing in s, that
.  Because we are on the interval  , we have 
 and therefore  .  Note now that the condition 
 may be re-written as 
where the first-order condition for agent ! has been invoked.  We can conclude that 
, and so the proposition is demonstrated.    !23
Table 1.  Mean and Variance of Yield Residuals by Site
Moment Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4
Mean 122.1 123.5 131.4 117.2
Std. Dev. 34.58 44.38 45.17 32.94
Table 2.  Standard Deviations and Correlations of Yield Residuals by Nitrogen level
N-level 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 200 250 300
Std. Dev. 19.67 21.05 25.32 28.66 31.08 35.58 30.64 35.99 31.28 32.59
Correlation Matrix
0 0.75 0.55 0.54 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.49
25 0.63 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73
50 0.74 0.65 0.70 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.73
75 0.76 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.74
100 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.82
125 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.91
150 0.88 0.87 0.90
200 0.84 0.92
250 0.9224
Table 3.  p Values for First-Stochastic Dominance, Proposition 1
N-level 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 200 250 300
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
25 0.3759 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
50 0.0764 0.2362 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
75 0.6561 0.8493 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5203 0.0000 0.8831 0.3188
125 0.9569 0.9952 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.9996 0.3080 0.9995 1.0000
150 0.6966 0.8667 1.0000 0.8436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
200 0.9547 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0188 0.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9994
250 0.9635 0.9971 1.0000 0.6504 0.0000 0.0000 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000
300 0.9566 0.9956 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.  p Values for ‘Not First-Degree Stochastic Maximal’, Proposition 1




75 0.3752 0.7068 1.0000
100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
125 0.9134 0.9899 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
150 0.4394 0.7372 1.0000 0.6908 0.1755 0.9994
200 0.9072 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0313 1.0000
250 0.9266 0.9953 1.0000 0.3683 0.7726 0.9982 0.0000 0.9991
300 0.9107 0.9917 1.0000 0.9999 0.0464 1.0000 0.0000 0.9985 0.000025
Table 5.  p Values for First-Stochastic Dominance, Proposition 2
N-level 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 200 250 300
0 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
50 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.9999
75 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.943 0.003 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 1.000 1.000 1.000
125 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.088 1.000 0.059 1.000 1.000 1.000
150 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.973 1.000 1.000 1.000
200 1.000 1.000 0.550 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
250 0.999 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.112
300 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 6.  p Values for ‘Not First-Degree Stochastic Maximal’, Proposition 2




75 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 0.9972
125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8834 1.0000
150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9456
200 1.0000 1.0000 0.2789 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
250 0.9974 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
300 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0114